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In the 6th and first half of the 5th century BC, Persian horsemen were armed with bows and javelins, and
fought as a light cavalry. In the second half of the 5th century in the western regions of the Persian empire there
was an increase in heavily-armoured cavalry, armed with the spears (palta) for thrusting and throwing. I propose
that this evolution is connected with the long wars against the Greeks and the deterioration of the morale quality
of Persian warriors. The attempt of the last Persian king Darius III to re-arm his horsemen with lances to fight the
Macedonian Companions did not succeed in saving the Achaemenid empire from collapse.
En el siglo VI y la primera mitad del siglo V A. C. los caballeros persianos fueron armados con arcos y jaba-
linas y luchaban como caballeria ligera. En la segunda mitad del siglo V A.C. en las regiones occidentales del
Imperio Persa se extienden caballeros de armadura pesada, armados con lanzas (palta), aunque la mayor parte de
caballeria estaba formada con armados ligeramente. Segun mi opinion, estos cambios en caballeria persiana eston
relacionados con la lenta guerra contra los griegos y tambien con empeoramiento de completacion de caballeria
local. El intento de Dario III de rearmar a sus caballeros con las lanzas largas para luchar con exito con caballeria
macedonica, fracaso por causa de caida del Imperio Aquemenido.
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It is well known that natural conditions exert an influence upon the evolution of social
structure. The latter dictates military recruitment which in turn affects tactics. Tactical devel-
opment therefore depends on a range of social factors, the enemies against whom the army
routinely wages war, and, of course, the development of armaments1. In the ancient world
progress in equestrianism especially depended on the natural conditions necessary for horse-
breeding (cf. Plat. Leg. 1.625d). Consequently some tactical methods for cavalry that
appeared on the battlefield were reflective of local circumstances. The Canadian colonel
George T. Denison Jr. (1872: 61) rightly noted that cavalry tactics have always changed in
response to the evolution of the troop types against which cavalry fought, as well as the tac-
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tics and weaponry of the enemy. In the Ancient Near East the earliest cavalry tactics were
those of light cavalry fighting with missiles. Once rulers began to organise their cavalry as
an effective armed force, with training and quite often heavier equipment, cavalry could fight
at close quarters not only against other horsemen, but also against infantry in array. During
the 6th-4th centuries BC cavalry evolved in the Achaemenid empire. The primary sources for
this subject are literary, while archaeological finds and pictorial evidence, as a rule, remain
secondary.
By the end of the 7th / first half of the 6th century BC, Persian and Median cavalry had
apparently developed along similar lines. Their evolution was no doubt influenced by the
Scythians who had been ruling in the Near East in the third quarter of the 7th century BC.
Herodotus notes that the Scythians trained the Medes in archery (Hdt. 1.73). The passage
claims that the noble Medes, the king’s sons, fought on horseback as Scythians, while the
Median tribesmen, armed mainly with missile weapons, were footmen (Xen. Cyr. 1.5.5;
Strab. 15.3.18-19). Xenophon informs us about the tactics of early Achaemenid Median and
Persian horsemen. He reports the way in which the mounted Medes were fighting in the 6th
century BC (Xen. Cyr. 1.4.23; cf. 2.1.7-8.): «Now the enemy [the Assyrians]2 on their part,
when they saw the Medes advance, halted, some with spears (παλτα, ) poised, others with
bows drawn, expecting that the other side would also halt as soon as they came within bow-
shot, just as they were accustomed generally to do; for it was their habit to advance only so
far against each other, when they came into closest quarters, and to skirmish with missiles,
oftentimes till evening» (translated by W. Miller). These were the usual tactics for light cav-
alry who could fight each other for a long period. The enemies approached each other up to
a couple of hundred metres and deployed from a deep marching column into line in order to
facilitate firing their missiles. Then they started shooting at each other3. At the same time
groups of horsemen often raced out from their formation to attack the enemy, and then with-
drew to their positions, while the enemy’s cavalrymen pursued them. During the war against
Lydia (547 BC) the Persian cavalry was still weak. They were unable to withstand the charge
of the Lydian mounted lancers and for this reason the Persian king Cyrus II deployed pack-
camels against them whose appearance and smell frightened the enemy’s horses (Hdt. 1.80;
Xen. Cyr. 6.2.18; 7.1.22, 27; Front. Strat. 2.4.12; Polyaen. 7.6.6; Ael. Nat. anim. 3.7, 11.36;
cf. Procop. Bel. Vand. 2.11.48)4.
In 530 BC the army of Cyrus the Great fought against the Massagetae nomads in the
same way using missile weapons. Herodotus (1.214) says «This battle was the fiercest that
has ever been fought between barbarian peoples... It is said that at first they stood apart and
shot arrows at each other and that then, when their arrows were used up, they fell to hand-to-
hand combat with spears and daggers. They stood fighting together for a long time, with nei-
ther side wanting to... run, but in the end the Massagetae prevailed. Most of the Persian army
was killed right there in battle, and yes, even Cyrus died...» (translated by W. Blanco). The
troops of the Persians and Massagetae included both cavalry and infantry and the tactics of
the two armies were the same: a prolonged archery exchange, after which the warriors passed
to hand-to-hand fighting with spears and short swords (akinakes) once their stock of arrows
was spent. These were typical tactics for mounted and foot archers. For example, the Mon-
gols, for the most part horse-archers, fought in this way in the 13th century (Marco Polo,
chap. 198, 201, 208, 225; cf. 79, 122-123).
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Having occupied the Near and Middle East, the Achaemenids began to develop their cav-
alry. They distributed fiefs to the Persians, Medes, Hyrcanians and other peoples, and land-
holders were obliged to send armed horsemen to the king’s army (Xen. Cyr. 8.4.28, 6.10-11,
8.20). Neo-Babylonian tablets refer to «land of bow», «horse», or «chariot». «Land of horse»
(bı-t sı-sî) is known from a tablet from Sippar, dated to 523 BC, in which a fief is called bı-t
aspatu (VS. V.55). This document informs us that one Babylonian Ili-aqabi leased a piece of
such land. G. Cardascia (1951: 8, n. 7) specifies that the bı-t aspatu is an Iranian parallel to
the Akkadian bı-t sı-sî, formed from the Persian root asp- («horse»). M. A. Dandamayev
explains that the Iranian word replaced the Akkadian one when this system of land tenure was
introduced by the Persians (Dandamayev, Lukonin 1980: 159). But it is difficult to understand
the relationship between the bı-t sı-sî and bı-t ritti («land of hand») because in the tablet the for-
mer is a subset of the latter. The bı-t ritti was a state-owned estate worked by a temple or other
officers paying taxes to the king; it was not land connected with military service (Joannès
1981: 9-16, 43-44; Stolper 1985: 25, n. 97). It was perhaps with good reason that Xenophon
attributed the creation of the Persian cavalry to Cyrus the Great (Cyr. 4.3.4-26, 5.58).
By the time of Darius I’s Scythian campaign (between 514 and 511 BC) the Achaemenid
cavalry were still forced to yield to Scythian horsemen, nomads who practised equestrianism
from childhood. The Persian cavalry had to retreat in the face of the Scythian horse-archers’
attack and seek the protection of its infantry, which the nomads did not dare attack. Herodotus
(4.128) describes these tactics thus: «The Scythian horse always routed the Persian horse, and
when the Persian cavalry would fall back in flight on their infantry, the infantry would come
up to their aid; and the Scythians, once they had driven in the horse, turned back for fear of
the infantry» (translated by A.D. Godley). It is clear that the Persian cavalry continued to fight
using the same methods as previously, though Xenophon attributes to Cyrus II the arming of
horsemen with a heavy palton instead of missile weapons (Cyr. 4.3.9, 58). The palton was a
specific Persian spear which could be use as a javelin and a lance (Xen. Cyr. 4.3.9; De re eq.
12,12; see figs. 1, 6, 9, 10, 12). It is most likely, however, that Xenophon is writing about the
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Fig. 1. The Persians. The drawing of the read-figure crater from Naples (the 4th
century BC). Note the chlamydes are untypical for the Persians. The
horse without the saddle blanket is a Greek feature. After Bittner, 1985:
Taf. 7.1.
cavalry of his own time, i.e. the late 5th/ early
4th century BC (Xen. Cyr. 4.3.23; 7.1.46;
8.8.22; Diakonoff 1956: 29-34; Breitenbach
1967: 1716; Frolov 1976: 257-258; 1991:
315-316). Xenophon drafted his description
of Cyrus’ military reforms to publicise his
own ideas about the superiority of close-quar-
ter weaponry over missile weapons (Cyr.
2.1.7, 9, 3.17-20; 4.2.24; cf. 1,2,13).
Had the tactics of the Achaemenid cavalry
changed by the beginning of the Graeco-Per-
sian wars in the very early 5th century BC?
Herodotus (7.84) informs us about the arms
and armament of the mounted Persians in
Xerxes’ army as follows: «The Persians,
equipped like their infantry, except that some
of them wore headgear of hammered bronze
and iron» (translated by A.D. Godley). He describes the Persian foot in this way (7.61): «They
wore on their heads loose caps called tiaras, and on their bodies embroidered sleeved tunics,
with scales of iron like the scales of fish in appearance, and trousers on their legs; for shields
they had wicker bucklers (γε,ρρα), with quivers hanging beneath them; they carried short
spears, long bows, and reed arrows, and daggers that hung from the girdle by the right thigh»
(translated by A.D. Godley). Accordingly, the Persian cavalry were armed with bows and
spears, and naturally palta, daggers and akinakes (α’κινα,κες). Note the gerrha, large wicker
shields, were arms of infantrymen alone5. The horsemen wore iron scale corselets and bronze or
iron helmets (Hdt. 7.84; cf. 7.61; 9.22; Plut. Aristid. 14,6)6. We can observe the tactics of these
cavalry in combat against the Greeks. Herodotus describes the attack of the Persian horsemen at
Plataea in the 479 BC in this way (Hdt. 9.49): «The horsemen rode at them [the Greeks] and shot
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Fig. 2. Persian mounted bowman. The drawing of
the cup of the master Triptolemus (proba-
ble the 470s BC). After Head, 1992: Fig.
12 b.
Fig. 3. The drawing of the left longitudinal wall of the relief of Payava’s sarcophagus showing
the charge of the Lycian cavalry on the Pisidian (?) footmen (375-362 BC). After
Nikulina, 1994: Fig. 70.
’’
arrows and javelins among the whole Greek army to
its great hurt, since they were mounted archers and
difficult to deal with in an encounter» (translated by
A.D. Godley; cf. Hdt. 9.18, 20, 22). On the basis of
this passage it would appear that the main weapon of
the Persian cavalry was the bow (Hignett 1963: 45;
Khazanov 1968: 186). However, it is clear from
Herodotus’ information that the Persian horsemen
were not only bowmen, but also javelineers (Hdt.
7.61, 84; cf. Xen. Cyr. 1.2.12, 4.4; 2.1.7; 6.2.16;
figs. 2, 4, 5, 13). The prevalence of mounted archers,
of course, is a result of the presence in the Mardo-
nius’ army of a large contingent of peoples from
Central Asia, whose high quality the «Father of his-
tory» notes elsewhere (Hdt. 9.71). At this time the
Persian battle-line comprised foot archers protected
by shield-bearers (gerrhophoroi γερροϕο,ροι) in
the front, while the horsemen were placed on the
flanks. In the early 5th century BC the tactics of the
Achaemenid cavalry were those typical of light cav-
alry and traditional for the Persians: they discharged
missiles at the enemy array and launched sudden attacks against their opponent’s dispositions,
especially its flanks (Evans 1984: 14). However, the charges of the Persian horsemen against the
Greek hoplites’ phalanx were not successful (Hdt. 9.23, 25; cf. figs. 5, 9, 12).
A charge of light cavalrymen against Greek hoplites is depicted on a Clazomenian sar-
cophagus (fig. 13)7. These horsemen are armed with yatagan-shaped swords (machaerae) and
short spears for close-combat, while bows in bowcase-quivers (goryti, γωρυτοι,) hang from
their belts. These features most probably indicate that these horsemen are of Persian origin,
and not Eurasian nomads – Cimmerians or Scythians. The date of the sarcophagus (ca. 500
BC) also supports this conclusion. Dogs assist the horsemen in the battle, though classical
sources do not mention the Persian employment of war-dogs. These animals were mostly
used by the inhabitants of Western Anatolia (Plin. NH. 8.143; Poll. 5.47; Polyaen. 7.2.1; Ael.
Var. Hist. 13.46) and by the Caspians and Hyrcanians (Val. Flac. Argon. 6.106-108; Ael. NA.
7.38), and the Persians might have adopted their use in the battle from these peoples (cf. Hdt.
7.187)8. However, it is more likely that the dogs depicted on Clazomenian sarcophagi had a
sacred meaning, rather than a historical significance (Moleva 1998: 61-62). In these depic-
tions Persian horsemen charge against the disordered ranks of Greek hoplites, who have
already lost some warriors killed and wounded. In these circumstances the attack might
achieve good results, as a cavalry charge has more psychological than physical force. An
infantryman fears that a horse might knock him down and wound him with its hoofs, while
the rider attacks him with his weapons (Marmont 1846: 53-54; Nolan 1854: 273; Keegan
1986: 95-97). We know that the retreat of the Persian troops at Plataea from the attacking
Greeks was protected not only by Persian cavalry, still too weak to fight against hoplites, but
primarily by Boeotian cavalry, who knew how to resist Hellenes (Hdt. 9.68-69). Herodotus
(9.68) writes: «They accordingly all fled, save the cavalry, Boeotian and other; this helped the
fleeing men in so far as it remained between them and their enemies and shielded its friends
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Fig. 4. The eastern horseman wearing the
Greek corselet and chiton. The
drawing of the read-figure kylix
from Orvieto (the first half of the 5th
century BC). After Stähler, 1992:
Abb. 16.
from the Greeks in their flight» (translated by A.D. Godley). Thus the Achaemenid cavalry,
without supporting infantry, could not fight against Greek hoplites and the picture on the sar-
cophagus shows us the final stage of a battle when the hoplite line has already broken.
In the 460-450s BC some changes were introduced into the structure of Persian levies
from the Western satrapies (Sekunda 1992: 18, 21-22, 24; Nefedkin 2001: 407). The number
of infantrymen armed like peltasts was considerably increased and they frequently became
the main force of an army. It is probable that they were drawn mainly from the inhabitants of
Anatolia (fig. 3). At the same time, heavily-armoured horsemen also appeared, their horses
protected with chamfrons, peytrals and thigh-pieces (figs. 3, 10). The offensive weaponry of
these riders consisted of the sword and two palta, often without a bow (Xen. An. 1.5.15, 8.3,
6-7; Cyr. 6.4.1; 7.1.2; Diod. 14.22.6; cf. figs. 1, 6, 9, 10, 12). Some of the horsemen had only
one palton (Xen. Cyr. 4.3.58; 6.2.16; 8.8.22). The lat-
ter was both a missile and hand-to-hand weapon. There
is no firm evidence for Persian horsemen using shields
in the mid-5th century, as Duncan Head (1992: 37–38)
and Nicholas Sekunda (1992: 21) suggest. The horse-
men on the relief from Yeniceköy, perhaps, do not have
rectangular shields, but rather sleeved clothing, the
kandys (κα,νδυς), which Persian and Median riders
often wore draped across the shoulders as a cloak
(Head 1992: 39; see Munro 1912: Pt. 1. P. 66, fig. 2;
see fig. 10; cf. fig. 8). There is a clay tablet from Nip-
pur that contains a contract between the Mirashu fami-
ly business and one Gadal-iama in the 421 BC. He asks
the firm for military equipment including a bronze
shield and an iron «club», perhaps umbo (UCP. 9.275;
see Ebeling 1952: 210; Rahe 1980: 91-92). The caval-
ryman might have wielded a shield when he dismount-
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Fig. 5. The drawing of the relief representing the fight of the Greeks and Persians,
the southern frieze of the Nica’s temple at Athens (ca. 425 BC). Probably it
is the battle of Plataea. After Stähler, 1992: Abb. 20g.
Fig. 6. The drawing of the Persian
horseman on the chalcedony
stamp-seal (probably the sec-
ond half of the 4th century BC).
After Sekunda, 1992: 25.
ed, but to my knowledge there is no other evidence for Achaemenid cavalry using shields.
Bronze shields were typical in the Near East in the earlier period (the 8th-7th centuries BC),
but in Mesopotamia the panoply of a horseman did not include a shield.
Only noble Achaemenid cavalrymen possessed armour. They were usually the guards of
a governor or members of a landowner’s family (cf. Xen. Hel. 3.4.10; Plut. Ages. 8,3). Thus,
in the mid-5th century BC, Persian horsemen were not mounted horse-archers, but heavier
armoured cavalrymen equipped with palta. They were able to fight in close-combat for which
more extensive bodily protection was especially necessary.
In this epoch cavalry did not need to be formed in a loose line for firing missiles. In the lat-
er 5th / early 4th century BC, Achaemenid cavalry used to form into deep columns for the
charge and more easily overwhelmed Greek cavalry, but Persian horsemen did not usually
charge the close phalanx of the Hellenic hoplites (Xen. Hell. 3.4.13-14, 23-24; Ages. 1.30-32;
Hell. Oxyr. 6.1-2; Plut. Ages. 10; Paus. 3.9.6). «Square formations» (τετρα,γωνοι τα,ξεις)
came to be considered by Greek tacticians as the usual deployment for Persian cavalry (Polyb.
12.18.2-5; Asclep. Tact. 7.3; Ael. Tact. 18.5; Arr. Tact. 16.9). Contemporary cavalry tactics are
described by Xenophon (Hell. 3.4.13-14) in his account of the engagement at Dascyleium in
the 396 BC: «Most of the time he [Agesilaus] pursued his march through the country in safety;
but when he was not far from Dascyleium, his horsemen, who were going on ahead of him,
rode to the top of a hill so as to see what was in front. And by chance the horsemen of Pharn-
abazus, under the command of Rhathines and Bagaeus, his bastard brother, just about equal to
the Greek cavalry in number, had been sent out by Pharnabazus and likewise rode to the top of
this same hill. And when the two squadrons saw one another, not so much as four plethra apart
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Fig. 7. The Persian, armed with the tiara, hunting a lion. The drawing of a fragment of the
chalcedony cylindrical seal (the 4th century BC). After Littauer, 1979: Fig. 85.
[around 120 m], at first both halted, the
Greek horsemen being drawn up four
deep like a phalanx, and the barbarians
with a front of not more than twelve,
but many men deep. Then, however,
the barbarians charged. When they
came to a hand-to-hand encounter, all
of the Greeks who struck anyone
broke their spears, while the barbar-
ians, being armed with palta of cornel-
wood, speedily killed twelve men and
two horses. Thereupon the Greeks
were turned to flight. But when Agesi-
laus came to the rescue with the ho-
plites, the barbarians withdrew again
and one of them was killed» (translat-
ed by C.L. Brownson). In this instance
the Persian formation was not a
marching column, but, like the Greek
deployment, a battle-formation. Both
the Greek and Persian cavalry’s van-
guards were therefore advancing in
battle-formation since an encounter
with the enemy was very likely and because the terrain permitted this deployment.
How are we to explain the transformation of the Persian battle-order and, correspondingly,
Persian tactics in the late 5th - early 4th centuries BC? A deep formation was usually reflective
of the low quality of the warriors, and this is especially the case with cavalry: troopers of lower
quality were placed in the middle ranks of a battle-array (cf. Arr. Tact. 35.5-6; Mauric. Strat. 2.6;
Leo. Tact. 12.40-45; see Agapeev 1902: 241-242). The deep formation of the Persian horsemen
is evidently explained the following way: the most no-
ble and well-armed and armoured riders were in front,
while the guardsmen and armed retainers were
crowded behind them. The noblemen had to fight at
the front of the array to justify their social status. In
the course of the charge a «wedge» could evolve out
of the deep mounted formation, when the commander
and the bravest horsemen rode ahead and other riders,
the large part of the charging cavalry, followed them
forming a triangle-shaped formation (Arr. An. 1.15.7;
Delbrück 1921: 32-34; cf. figs. 3, 10). The deteriora-
tion in the morale of the Persian landholders’ cavalry
was related to changes in recruitment: landholders
preferred to employ mounted retainers and servants
for military service rather than take the field them-
selves. It is not only Xenophon (Cyr. 8.8.19-22) who
informs us about this development, but also the
above-mentioned Nippurian cuneiform tablet in
which Gadal-iama is hired for service in a landholder’s cavalry. These mercenary fighters did
not aspire to be in the first ranks and place themselves in danger, but preferred to be within the
depth of the formation. The commanders had to put the bravest riders in front of the mounted ar-
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Fig. 8. The noble Persian horseman. The drawing of the
bas-relief of the western longitudinal wall of the
«Alexander Sarcophagus» at Sidon (the later 4th
century BC). From Bittner, 1985: Taf. 41.1.
Fig. 9. The drawing of the single-combat
of the Persian horseman and
Greek hoplites. The Graeco-Per-
sian seal (the 4th century BC). Af-
ter Stähler, 1992: Taf. 6.3.
ray in order to overwhelm the enemy’s cavalry using the depth of the formation (cf. Arr. Tact.
35.5-6; Leo. Tact. 12.40-45)9. In a close formation even the poorest warriors felt supported by
their companions and bravely went into the fight. In these circumstances it is not a question of
physical impetus, but rather the psychological impact upon the fighters (Golovin 1907: 136-
137, 156-157).
The predominance of the palton over the bow in cavalry equipment was possibly con-
nected with the characteristic deterioration of the Persian cavalry, because it is difficult to
shoot from a deep formation, and besides an adequate level of archery requires much more
time to learn than throwing a javelin10. It was probably in the second half of the 4th century
BC that a new type of javelin became widespread among Persian cavalry, the meságkulon,
which had a loop affixed to its middle to facilitate throwing. A scholion to the Andromache
of Euripides describes this weapon (1133): «mesankylona are a type of javelin, tied around
the middle by cord, by holding which [the javelin] is thrown» (see Winter 1912: Taf. 13-14;
Andreae 1977: Abb. 25). The spread of this new kind of javelin probably indicates the
increased importance of missiles and, consequently, a further deterioration in the fighting
quality of the main body of the Achaemenid cavalry.
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9 Compare the remarks of the cavalry general-major Charle-Emmanuel de Warnery on the close-formation
of a squadron: «Un escadron doit être forme sur trois rangs ... et sur deux seulement il n’auroit pas assés de force
ni de poids & ne pourroit fournir le choc, au lieu que sur trois les deux derniers non seulement poussent le pre-
mier, mais même ils l’empéchent de s’arrètes & reculer: les chevaux eux mêmes s’empressent d’avancer, lors
qu’ils sentent derriere eux ceux qui serrent la coupe & qui leur donnent des atteintes avec les pieds de devant»
(Warnery 1781: 55-56).
10 In the Gadal-iama’s tablet two spears and 130 arrows are specified in his armament, but there is no men-
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Fig. 10. The horsemen protected with thigh-pieces and armed with palta. The
drawing of the Yeniceköy relief, Hellespontic Phrygia (the late 5th / the early
4th century BC). The bottom view. After Munro, 1912: Pt. 1. P. 66, fig. 2.
Fig. 11. The Persian cavalryman armed with the long lance. The drawing of the gold akinakes sheaths
from Scytian king’s tumulus Chertomlyk (the 320s BC). From Tolstoj, Kondakov, 1889: Fig. 3.
Clearly all the changes in
the Persian military, which be-
gun in the mid-5th century BC,
were connected with the long
war against the Greeks. Scythed
chariots appeared at the same
time, which allowed the Per-
sians to break the Hellenic pha-
lanx. The charge of their ar-
moured cavalry would subse-
quently penetrate breaches
made in the enemy’s formation,
while the «peltasts» (usually
Anatolians) played an auxiliary
role in the fighting (cf. Xen.
Cyr. 7.1.9, 28; Hell. 4.1.17-
19)11. The commander was fre-
quently in the front line of the
charging cavalry. The role of the
cavalry charge was to break
through the enemy’s guards, kill
their commander and, in consequence, decide the fate of a battle (Xen. An. 1.8.24-26). In the Asi-
atic style of fighting the heavily-armoured horsemen were an arrow-point directed against the
enemy’s general. These tactics were probably based on the traditions of the Heroic Age, when a
duel between opposing generals escorted by their bodyguards was the main phase of combat.
In the Achaemenid army the tendency to increase the number of the armoured mounted
spear-men was intensified by the encounter with the Macedonian Companions at the battle of
the River Granicus (334 BC). The Companions, armed with long lances, were armoured cav-
alrymen who had neither greaves nor shields. They fought in deep and close squadrons. Arri-
an (An. 1.15.5) accounts for the defeat of the Persian cavalry in hand-to-hand fighting at the
Granicus by the fact that the Macedonian cavalry was armed with cornel-wood lances (ξυσ−
τοις κρανεινοις) instead of the palta of their opponents (cf. Head 1992: 34)12. In close-com-
bat the lance appeared to be a more convenient weapon and was highly effective in the expe-
rienced hands of a cavalryman (Anisimov 1912: 4-5). The higher standards of training among
the Macedonian Companions, together with their tactic of thrusting their spear into the oppo-
nent’s face, unexpected by the Persian riders, resulted in their success in combat. The Persians
relied on throwing their palta at the beginning of the action, after which they could fight in at
close quarters with a palton held in reserved or with swords (Arr. An. 1.15.2-5), whereas the
Macedonian Companions passed immediately to close-quarters combat. On the other hand,
Xenophon considers a pair of palta as better weaponry for a cavalryman than one spear (De re
eq. 12.12). The author based this conclusion on his own military experience: in his day in com-
bat between Greek cavalrymen armed with lances and Persian horsemen equipped with two
palta the former were defeated, as at the battle of Dascyleium in 396 BC (Xen. Hell. 3.4.13)13.
After the battle of the River Granicus Darius III started to increase the number of horse-
men equipped with lamellar armour capable of resisting Alexander’s cavalry in close combat.
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Fig. 12. The drawing of the Persian horseman, Greek archer and
hoplites. The Attic red-figure hydria (the early 4th century




At the battle of Issus (333 BC) the Persians already had heavily-armoured horsemen who
fought –not unsuccessfully– against the Thessalian cavalry at close quarters (Curt. 3.11.15;
Arr. An. 2.11.3). Having been defeated in this battle, the Persian ruler continued to prepare
for war, training and arming his levies. Diodorus (17.53.1) tells us that Darius III armed his
army with swords and longer lances (τα ... ξι,ϕη και τα ξυστα) before the battle of
Gaugamela in the 331 BC. Curtius informs us that Persian warriors previously armed with
javelins (jaculae) were now also equipped with swords and shields (4.9.3: scuta, gladii). This
information relates to re-armament of the Achaemenid foot, but equipping the Persian horse-
men with lances was a logical measure, as it increased their chances of victory in hand-to-
hand fighting against the Companions14. A reflection of this reform can be found in the pic-
ture of a Persian horseman with a long lance (about 3,5 m) on the gold akinakes sheaths from
the Scythian king’s tumulus at Chertomlyk, from the 8th barrow in the «Five brothers» group,
and on the sheath which came from the tumulus at Chayan in the north-western Crimea and
now in the Metropolitan Museum (fig. 11)15. The traditional date of the sheaths is the second
half of the 4th century BC, and that from Chertomlyk 350/340–320 BC. I believe that the aki-
nakes sheaths could date to 331-320 BC16.
At the battle of Gaugamela the mounted Massagetae on Darius III’s left wing and the
Persian, Parthian and Indian horsemen on his right employed close-combat tactics (Arr. An.
3.13.4; cf. Curt. 4.9.3). Arrian (An. 3.15.2) reports: «There was no javelin-throwing and no
manoeuvring of horses, such as are usual in a cavalry engagement, but each tried to break his
way through whatever opposed him» (translated by P. A. Brunt). In fact, this passage
describes Darius’ horsemen attempting to break through an encircling enemy, an action
forced upon them, and consequently Arrian notes the rarity of this style of fighting. In 331
BC and later the main body of the Persian cavalry were composed of javelineers armed with
mesankyla (Arr. An. 7.6.5; cf. figs. 6, 8, 9). They formed in deep formation for combat (Arr.
An. 3.15.2), and fought with missiles and at close-quarters. Later, in 317 BC, Antigonus the
One-Eyed had Median horsemen armed with light spears (λο, γχαι) and Parthian horse-
archers (Diod. 19.29.2). The Medes, as I mentioned above, since Herodotus’ time, did not dif-
fer from the Persians in their equipment nor, in consequence, in tactics. So, the re-armament
of the Persian cavalry with lances had no long-term consequences after the fall of the
Achaemenid empire.
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Fig. 13. The fight of the Persian horsemen and the Greek hoplites. The drawing of Clazomenian
terracotta sarcophagus (ca. 500 BC). After Greenhalgh, 1973: Fig. 77.
, , , ,
In conclusion, in the 6th and first half of the 5th centuries BC Persian cavalry were armed
with bows and javelins. They fought as light irregular cavalry using hit-and-run tactics17. The
second half of the 5th century BC saw changes in the military forces of the western satrapies of
the Persian empire. Heavily-armoured horsemen proliferated in Persian armies, though the
larger part of the cavalry remained lightly equipped; the palton became the main shafted
weapon for thrusting and throwing. For combat horsemen formed deep columns and charged
to engage the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting. These changes within the Persian cavalry were
connected with the long series of wars against the Greeks and an increase in the military char-
acter of the Achaemenid landholders’ cavalry. The latter was the principal force of satrapal
armies, while the mounted militia played an auxiliary part. Darius III’s attempt to re-equip his
horsemen with long lances in order to compete with the Macedonian Companion cavalry was
unsuccessful, as the collapse of Achaemenid power demonstrates. In 324 BC, Alexander the
Great, as Darius before him, re-equipped noble Persians with xysta suited to hand-to-hand
fighting and joined them to the agema of the Companion cavalry (Arr. An. 7.6.5; cf. 8.2; 11.3;
Nikonorov 1997: 27), but such horsemen were few in number and Persian horsemen were still
fighting with short spears at the end of the 4th century BC.
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